Abstract. Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are expected to be utilized by internet of things (IoT) applications/services in various fields in the near future. However, studies on session key establishment between two nodes in WSNs are relatively recent compared to studies on long-term key establishment. This paper proposes a security and efficiency enhanced session key establishment scheme for hierarchical sensor networks in security-critical applications. The proposed scheme employs elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange (ECDH) and RSA signature verification to efficiently perform the most important security features of mutual authentication, verification of message integrity, and session key establishment.
Introduction
A wireless sensor network (WSN) is composed of a gateway and a number of sensor nodes (tens to thousands) that are deployed to collect data in a target area [1] . To date, most key establishment schemes for WSNs are designed to establish a long-term key that is used throughout the lifetime of the WSN, under the assumption that its lifetime is shorter than the attack time needed to determine the cryptographic keys [2] . However, if WSNs are employed by applications/services in areas such as manufacturing, distribution, and public facilities management [3] , their lifetimes may be longer. In this case, it would be advantageous in terms of security to encrypt messages using session keys instead of long-term keys [4] .
Lee and Kim [5] proposed a session key establishment scheme based on DiffieHellman key exchange (DHKE) [6] for hierarchical sensor networks that operates as illustrated in Fig. 1 . In their proposed scheme, each cluster head shares a session key with the gateway, encrypts its data using this key, and then sends the encryption result to the gateway. Their scheme is efficient in terms of communication costs because only two messages are exchanged to perform all the above functions in each session. However, their scheme does not provide mutual authentication between two nodes and is vulnerable to replay attacks and node capture attacks. In addition, if the longterm keying materials stored in the cluster head are exposed to an attacker, the secrecy of future session keys generated in the ensuing sessions cannot be guaranteed. Fig. 1 . Hierarchical sensor network, divided into several clusters and consists of sensor nodes, cluster heads, and a gateway. The cluster heads transmit the data collected from the sensor nodes to the gateway in respective clusters [5] .
In this paper, we propose a security enhanced session key establishment scheme for hierarchical sensor networks. The proposed scheme employs elliptic curve DiffieHellman key exchange (ECDH) [7] and RSA signature verification [8] to efficiently perform mutual authentication, verification of message integrity, and session key establishment, while considering communication costs and energy costs because sensor nodes and cluster heads are usually battery-powered.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the notations used in this paper. Section 3 introduces the security enhanced scheme and describes its phases in detail. Section 4 analyzes the security of the proposed scheme in terms of possible attacks against key establishment schemes used in WSNs. Section 5 analyzes the energy and communication costs associated with the proposed scheme. Finally, Section 6 concludes this paper. Private and public keys of GW for ECDH [7] [10]
Notations
Signing of a message x with a key k in the RSA signature scheme [8] 
Verification of a message x and its signature s with a key k in the RSA signature scheme [8] 
Encryption of a plaintext m using a symmetric key k DEC (k, c) Decryption of a ciphertext m using a symmetric key k datai Data transmitted by CHj to GW in the ith session ski Session key for the ith session || Concatenation operation ≤? or =?
Verification operation Tg or Tj Current timestamp of GW or CHj ΔT Maximum transmission delay time permitted
RSA Signatures
A pair of private and public keys for the RSA signature scheme [8] (kg,pr, kg,pb) is generated as follows: The scheme computes m = p·q, where p and q are large primes.
satisfies gcd(e, Φ(m)) = 1, and computes d that satisfies d·e ≡ 1 mod Φ(m). Here, the public key kg,pb is equal to m and e, and the private key kg,pr is equal to d. In Table 1 , SIG(kg,pr, x) denotes the signing of a message x with a key kg,pr, and is equal to x d mod Φ(m). VER(kg,pb, s, x) denotes the verification of a message x and its signature s with a key kg,pb. To verify them, the scheme computes x * = s e mod Φ(m) and then compares x with x * . If x * = x, then signature s is valid; otherwise, it is invalid.
Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange (ECDH)
A pair of private and public keys for the ECDH scheme [7] [10] (dj i , Qj i ) is generated as follows: The scheme first chooses a large prime p and defines the elliptic curve E over Zp (p >3) as the set of all pairs (x, y)∈Zp that satisfy y 2 ≡ x 3 + ax + b mod p and an imaginary point at infinity O, where 4a 3 + 27b 2 ≠ 0 mod p (a, b∈Zp). When P is a primitive element on the elliptic curve E and "×" denotes the elliptic curve multiplication, the scheme chooses an integer dj 1 (0 < dj 1 < n, where n is the number of points on E) and computes Qj 1 = dj 1 ×P. Here, Qj 1 is another element on E.
Description of the Proposed Scheme
Our proposed scheme establishes a session key based on asymmetric key techniques in order to resist session key attacks and provide secrecy for both past and future session keys. To take into account the computation costs and energy consumption of cluster heads, the proposed scheme chooses an efficient key exchange technique, ECDH [7] [10], from asymmetric key techniques with the same security level. The proposed scheme counters node impersonation attacks, man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks, etc., by providing mutual authentication between the gateway and the cluster head and verifying the integrity of messages using a design based on RSA signature verification [8] .
While sensor nodes and cluster heads in WSNs are usually low-end, small devices with limited resources [3] [14] [15] , in our scheme, the gateway is a resource-rich device. Further, we assume that the gateway is a trusted node that is not compromised. Our scheme is composed of a pre-deployment phase and a key establishment phase.
Pre-deployment Phase
The pre-deployment phase preloads keying materials into cluster heads or the gateway before nodes are deployed in the field. In this phase, the proposed scheme generates a pair of private and public keys (kg,pr, kg,pb) for RSA signatures [8] and a pair of private and public keys (dj 1 , Qj 1 ) for ECDH [7] . The scheme preloads (kg,pr, kg,pb) and Qj 1 into the gateway GW, and (dj } is secure unless the session key is exposed to an attacker because it is encrypted using the session key. When GW receives message {Cdata i } from CHj, it decrypts Cdata i using the session
. If the resulting decrypted value is the correct plaintext, then GW can authenticate the message sender as CHj.
-Secrecy of past and future session keys: An attacker should not be able to compute past or future session keys that were already used in previous sessions or will be generated in ensuing sessions, even when he/she obtains long-term keying materials. In the proposed scheme, the parameters stored in CHj are kg,pb and (dj i ,
Qj i
). Even when an attacker is able to obtain kg,pb, he/she will not be able to determine kg,pr from kg,pb because that is an integer factorization problem [5] . Meanwhile, (dj i , Qj i ) are ephemeral keys and CHj replaces them with (dj i+1 , Qj i+1 ) at the end of the ith session. If an attacker obtains dj i+1 between the ith and (i+1)th sessions and he/she eavesdrops on message {Qg i+1 , sg i+1 , Tg} in the (i+1)th session, he/she can compute the session key, ski+1(= dj i+1 ×Qg i+1 ), and decrypt the message, {Cdata i+1 }, by using ski+1. However, he/she cannot obtain any more information to restore any other session key but ski+1. As a result, the proposed scheme can satisfy data confidentiality and integrity in all other sessions except the (i + 1)th session. } is the response to GW's request. Therefore, an attacker is not able to perform replay attacks using these messages.
-Node capture attacks: Sensor nodes and cluster heads are vulnerable to node capture attacks because they are usually deployed without tamper-proof devices in unattended environments [11] . Therefore, security protocols should be designed to minimize the effects of such attacks [12] . In our scheme, even when an attacker physically captures CHj and extracts dj i , Qj i , or kg,pb from it, he/she is not able to find the private key kg,pr from the public key kg,pb because that is an integer factorization problem [6] . Further, because dj i and Qj i are not shared with other nodes except CHj, the attacker cannot obtain the other session keys except for a session key between CHj and GW. [13] .We assume that the cluster head transmits a total of l bytes of data to the gateway during one session.
Efficiency Analysis
The "Operations" column in Table 2 shows the kinds of operations and the number of times they are performed in our scheme and in Lee and Kim's scheme during one session. The "Energy costs" column shows the energy costs for our scheme and for Lee and Kim's scheme based on operation analysis of the two schemes and Potlapally et al.'s experimentation results [13] . We focus more on the energy costs in the cluster head than in the gateway because the cluster heads are battery-powered. Table 2 shows that our scheme is more efficient than Lee and Kim's scheme in terms of energy consumption based on computation costs (456.17+0.00121l < 1046.96+0.00242l). Two message exchanges are needed in both the proposed scheme and in Lee and Kim's scheme. However, the proposed scheme minimizes the number of messages, considering that it performs session key establishment, node authentication, and data encryption functions.
Conclusion
Compared to the studies on long-term key establishment, studies on session key establishment between two nodes in WSNs are relatively recent. In this paper, we proposed a public key-based session key establishment scheme for hierarchical sensor networks. Our scheme chooses efficient key exchange techniques, ECDH [7] [10] and RSA signature verification [8] , from asymmetric key techniques with the same security level. Our proposed scheme is secure against possible attacks targeting key establishment schemes, such as session key attacks, node impersonation attacks, MITM attacks, replay attacks, and node capture attacks, and provides secrecy for both past and future session keys. In addition, the proposed scheme is more efficient in terms of energy costs than other schemes based on asymmetric key techniques.
